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COMIREX-M-71

8 May 1969

COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

COMIREX-M-71

8 May 1969

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COMIREX meeting:

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GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM  
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION

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[Redacted]

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# Section I (Briefings and Reports on Operations)

## Operational Briefing -- Satellite

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1. [ ] reported satellite operations and scheduling as of 7 May as shown on page 6.

2. The NRO consultant reported that recovery of the first bucket of Mission 1051 is scheduled for 1100 local time tonight. He pointed out that they expect high quality coverage during the first ten days of this mission but that it will drop off after that. Overall it is expected that we have gotten some pretty good [ ] coverage on the first bucket.

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## Report on Aircraft Activities -- Far East

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3. [ ] reported nine successful BUMPY ACTION flights mostly in the Haiphong area during the period 2-8 May. There was one loss and one malfunction. Details are given on the following page.

4. There was no FOOD FAIR or GIANT SCALE coverage during the period 2-8 May.

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5. [ ] reported that there was a peripheral U-2 mission, using an oblique camera, along the coast of China on 7 May.

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6. [redacted] reported efforts to satisfy two priority South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:

a. Surveillance Coverage of Lines of Communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966) was reported on one priority target for the period 1-7 May. The specific target is identified by underlining in Tab A. The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam remains at 352.

b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 24-30 April 1969. Five BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time period and reported as successful have not been included. No SSM activity was observed.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba



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7. [redacted] reported that the standdown on GLASS LAMP is still in effect.

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8. [redacted] reported that for the 56-day period beginning 13 March 1969 eight GLASS LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 75.4 percent coverage of the area. During this period 144 of the 175 targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography.




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Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)Report from Data Base Working Group

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1. The Chairman, DBWG, reported that his Working Group has provided guidance relative to a standard report numbering system for all basic reports.

Report from Exploitation Research and Development Subcommittee

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2. [ ] emphasized the need for the R&D people to know as soon as possible what will be needed in the way of new equipment for exploitation [ ] imagery.

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Report from Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Working Group

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3. The Chairman, MCGWG, reported that his Working Group had been advised by the NRO consultant that the Doppler previously scheduled for the March launch of the KH-4B will most likely be delayed until the May launch. [ ] advised that while this delay may be tolerated it is not in the interests of optimum planning and that any additional slippage would seriously interfere with plans for using the data to be collected with the Doppler. The NRO consultant advised that the slippage was a fact and reassured the Committee that, based on the availability of the Doppler, he sees no slippage beyond the May launch. The Chairman, MCGWG, then added that he has heard two different reports on the reason for the slippage: mechanical problems; funding. If the latter is the real reason, he would like to know it and consult with the mapping community.

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Section IV (Action Items)

Report on Progress in Program for Basic Support Exploitation  
Requirements for FY 1970

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1. The Acting Chairman reminded members that a meaningful program for basic support exploitation during FY 1970 could not be prepared unless the agencies submit their requirements to EXSUBCOM. A poll taken of COMIREX members representing agencies likely to have such requirements resulted in the following reports:

a. DIA: Will provide requirements to EXSUBCOM very soon.

b. CIA: Submitted requirements on one category on 5 May, will have another group of categories ready by 14 May and the last group by 29 May.

c. Army: Is currently working on breaking requirements down into functional areas. Expect to be able to have requirements in to EXSUBCOM in about three weeks.

d. Air Force: FTD will have its first quarter requirements in by 16 May and requirements for the second quarter of FY 1970 by 2 June.

e. Navy: Can have first quarter requirements to EXSUBCOM 20-23 May.

2. The Chairman, EXSUBCOM, explained the coordination cycle following the receipt of requirements from the various agencies. Preparation of a consolidated draft by the EXSUBCOM Staff will require approximately one week; coordination at the Subcommittee level takes about three weeks (the aid of COMIREX members in expediting this phase of coordination was solicited); another week of staff work is

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required to consolidate the comments and come up with a revised set of requirements to be sent out for final coordination; then ready for COMIREX approval after the agencies have had a week for their final okay. Thus, it is expected that nearly six weeks will be required from the receipt of the initial drafts to the time when the exploitation components concerned can expect to receive the COMIREX-approved exploitation requirements for FY 1970.

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3. [ ] stressed the fact that, although his Subcommittee needs exploitation requirements for all of FY 1970, it would be helpful if the agencies would concentrate first on requirements for the first quarter. He also emphasized that receipt of requirements incrementally would help to speed things up as staff work can be started on requirements as received.

4. The Acting Chairman requested that all agencies have their first quarter requirements to [ ] by 23 May. He felt that a target date of no later than 1 July should be set for requirements for the last three quarters, but said that a final target date would be established at the next COMIREX meeting. [ ] urged that in the meantime, prior to 23 May and between then and the final deadline, requirements be forwarded to EXSUBCOM in increments as ready.

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Report on Need for Accelerated Processing of First Bucket of 1051

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5. [ ] reported that he had consulted with [ ] on the benefits to be gained from sending an NPIC team to EK or taking other measures for crash exploitation of the first bucket of 1051. The Acting Chairman, ICRS, stated that after considering all aspects of the suggestion there had been mutual agreement to proceed with the normal exploitation schedule and to task the second bucket of 1051 to continue to cover the 14 "Extraordinary" targets on that same priority basis.

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Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

Release of Targeting Data Derived from TALENT-KEYHOLE  
to SEATO for SEAP-34 (COMIREX-D-2.11/20)



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1. The Acting Chairman reviewed briefly the history of this request up to the point of USIB's tabling its consideration pending decision by the NDPC as to the propriety of releasing SECRET information to certain countries in SEATO. NDPC has ruled that SEATO can receive SECRET information.

2. The Acting CIA member, noting that CIA has been the lone dissenter throughout consideration of this release, recommended that the memorandum prepared in July 1968 (COMIREX-D-2.11/17) should be resubmitted to the Board, with the present CIA footnote. He felt that new information, such as the results of the NDPC deliberations, could be set forth in a covering memorandum.

3. Although the Executive Secretary pointed out that the CIA footnote to COMIREX-D-2.11/17 was not in accord with the policy guidelines for the Sanitization Manual (COMOR-D-7/44), since it placed emphasis on the possibility of revealing the existence of a satellite program rather than on protection of information on the quantity and quality of its product, the Acting CIA member averred that CIA would like its footnote to stand unchanged.

4. The Acting Chairman charged the Executive Secretary with responsibility for preparing a covering memorandum to the Board reflecting the views of members as expressed at this meeting.

Release of Information Concerning




COMIREX-D-2.11/21)




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5. The Acting CIA member expressed the opinion that the recommendation for release of information concerning



was too general and that COMIREX



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should decide what specific information is to be released and state that in the recommendation. This observation appeared reasonable and it was agreed that the specific items to be released at this time would be the Camera Manual and the pertinent Tab of the Program for Planning Exploitation, FY 1970-1975--the same material selected for release within the U. S. community.

6. The Executive Secretary was directed by the Acting Chairman to revise the proposed memorandum to the DCI to cover the specific items to be released, to insure it is clear that release includes both intelligence and mapping components, and to include

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Planning Factors for the Exploitation of Reconnaissance Imagery:  
National Reconnaissance Program, FY 1970-1974  
(COMIREX-D-31.1/3A, renumbered COMIREX-D-31.5/2A)

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11. [redacted] asked why there continued to be a delay in the publication of the planning factors for exploitation at the TALENT-KEYHOLE level. He expressed concern that although COMIREX had originally approved the document on 20 March in the [redacted] and that the security people, working with the NRO, had provided us with an approved T-KH version not long thereafter, it was still unpublished. [redacted] replied that the new tab approved for T-KH dissemination included some changes which had nothing to do with the change from [redacted] to T-KH and needed to be checked. [redacted] confirmed that he had noted some of these same discrepancies and considered that, whereas some of them might be updates of information the others had to be inaccuracies in either the first or the second paper, and these must be checked and corrected. [redacted] then noted that when the tab revision was under discussion he had attended a meeting at the Pentagon in the absence of [redacted] [redacted] emphasized that whereas those present were fully qualified to agree on the elements of information which could be released at the T-KH level they would not necessarily have equal expertise on technical details. The Acting Chairman concluded further discussion with the request that [redacted] get together with the NRO consultant to iron out the problems and prepare the information in question for publication at the T-KH level.

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Section VI (Other Business)Satellite Imagery Reconnaissance in Terms of: Flexibility; Compatability of Requirements and NRO Schedule for Next Five Years; Need for Near Real-time Readout; Employment of Air-breathing Reconnaissance Systems

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1. The Acting Chairman advised that he wished again to discuss the question of the flexibility of satellite reconnaissance systems as [ ] feels that the time has come for COMIREX to advise the United States Intelligence Board as to the realities of the problem and how flexibility relates to requirements that have been approved by the Board. [ ] suggested that one simple approach to a report on flexibility would be to transmit to the Board the memorandum sent to COMIREX by [ ] (attached to COMIREX-D-13.6/1) with a covering memorandum. Further discussion, while agreeing with this as a partial answer to the problem, developed other dimensions and problems which were sufficiently closely related to suggest that they be handled simultaneously or at least that an inter-relation be identified to USIB.

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2. As a start, the Executive Secretary reminded COMIREX that in January it had reviewed a draft memorandum to the Board, "NRO Satellite Launch Schedule, KH-4, [ ] for FY 70-74" and that this memorandum had been prepared in anticipation of the need for USIB to state its requirements so that NRO may develop its financial program. In its present form, the memorandum reviews requirements and the NRO launch schedule in rather general terms and concludes with the recommendation that NRO be advised that the tentative schedule of launches appears satisfactory and, as changes would seem to be necessary, another memorandum would be addressed to USIB. It is apparent that this approach represents a long-term view of requirements and makes no provision for the sort of emergency situation which occurred after the short-lived 1050 had discovered [ ]. To make a review of requirements realistic, any COMIREX reports to the Board would obviously make it necessary to include information on the type of operational restrictions outlined by [ ] and to include a note on the relative inflexibility [ ].

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4. COMIREX also concluded that it could not supply USIB with a thorough rationale on launch schedules, static requirements, and crisis situations in various degrees of urgency without commenting on the value of near real-time imagery. Because of the categories of intelligence and varying time urgency implications requiring different emphasis according to the situation--warning/indications, crisis, current intelligence production--it was agreed that an in depth, separate, and longer-term review should be undertaken and that there would not be adequate time to examine this problem in depth prior to submission of the COMIREX memorandum on the NRO schedule or to a discussion of flexibility in general.

5. It was generally agreed that while COMIREX should review its requirements and report to the Board in terms of present reconnaissance capabilities to meet them, further consideration must be given as to the best staff approach. It was noted that a procedure entailing preparation of several studies addressing each facet of our requirement tied to a request to provide guidance to NRO for its five-year budget planning could not be decided upon until such guidance has been requested. This should come out of the RPG meeting to be held the week of 12 May. The Acting Chairman, while agreeing to the need for further discussion and recognizing the need to advise USIB on the question of flexibility, suggested that such advice should be handled in the context of information available in [redacted] memorandum and in light of current problems encountered and concern expressed by members of the Board. [redacted] requested that whatever action was decided upon include the cancellation of any requirements which have been superseded by new requirements or changing situations.

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Film Distribution Requirements

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6. [ ] reported that his Subcommittee is working on the establishment of community [ ] film requirements. Each organization has been requested to submit any questions or needs for specific data relative to characteristics of the film that has not already been released in the Manual or by [ ] in his memorandum (reference COMIREX-D-34.3/1). A consolidated list of questions will be developed by the Chairman, EXSUBCOM, and discussed with [ ] and the film processors during the first week of June. In addition, NPIC, which has gone through a very extensive review of its requirements for [ ] film, has agreed to share its findings with other members of the community so they will be able to take advantage of what NPIC has learned.

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7. The Air Force member raised the suggestion made by [ ] that a seminar might be held on this matter. [ ] pointed out that it was generally felt that a seminar at this time would be unproductive but that the possibility of having one next month after problem areas have been identified was left open.

Requirement for Photographic Coverage of Cuba

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8. The Acting Chairman indicated that the Chairman felt that COMIREX should be aware of the fact that there has not been any photographic coverage of Cuba since [ ] and that a standdown is in effect pending the outcome of deliberation on the platform to be used if coverage is to be continued. [ ] agreed to provide a report on the time-phasing or planning with regard to reconnaissance over the island at the next COMIREX meeting.

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9. It was agreed that, since COMIREX must report to USIB on the 56-day requirement for coverage of Cuba, we should state in our report that COMIREX is looking into the matter of the standdown and the seriousness of its effect on our intelligence needs.

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Review of Middle East Coverage

10. The Executive Secretary remarked on the timeliness of today's briefing by [ ] and said that [ ] had suggested that COMIREX should look at coverage of the Middle East and go on record as having reviewed requirements and the adequacy of coverage.

11. [ ] reported that in general the Middle East area we are concerned with has been a priority one requirement for KH-4 search and that we are getting coverage of all of it at least once within a quarter. Specific priority targets [ ]

12. The Chairman, ICRS, also reported that his Subcommittee had been asked some time ago to conduct a formal review of Middle East requirements and that this is under way.

13. The NRO representative called attention to the fact that the special Army priorities on the Middle East block [ ] have not been taken on the current mission, because their priority is not high enough, but indicated that there would still be an opportunity to cover them if the priority were raised. No one suggested raising the priority.

14. The Acting DIA member reported that the JCS is currently running studies on reconnaissance missions all over the world, including [ ] and peripheral flights. While local commanders, CINCPAC for instance, are coming in with urgent requests for reconnaissance, the vulnerability problem may result in rather drastic curtailment of activity.

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Information for Preparation of Quarterly Report

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15. [redacted] reported that he has not received resource information reports from DIA or NPIC. [redacted] said that NPIC's report had been completed on 5 May but he had held it pending resolution of some questions internally. He said, however, that the NPIC input would be in [redacted] hands shortly.

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[redacted]

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Executive Secretary

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachments  
Tabs A & B

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